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### 1NC---OFF

Eurocentric Territorialization K

#### The aff’s attempt to displace white land ownership is driven by a ficticious sense of belonging that attempts to map out the world---the impact is violent reterritorialization

**Bifo 15** [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 121-6]

Identity and Identification

In the 1980s Goldstein had been an activist of the Kach Party, an openly racist, anti-Arab right-wing organization founded in Israel by Rabbi Meir Kahane. Later, as a doctor, Goldstein gained notoriety in Israel because he refused to treat Arabs who needed medical attention. After receiving his assignment as a military doctor, he told his commanders that his religious faith did not allow him to treat wounded or ill Arabs, including those who served in the Israel Defense Forces. His superiors decided not to punish his refusal, but merely to reassign him to South Lebanon.

It would be as unfair to read Goldstein’s crime as an expression of the Orthodox Israeli culture. But we have to read madness in its context, and we can read the crime as a symptom of that malady that goes under the name of identity.

Identity is not naturally ascribed; it is a cultural product: it is the effect of the hypostatization (fixation and naturalization) of the cultural difference, of the psychological, social and linguistic particularity. Identity is continuity and confirmation of the place and of the role of a speaker in the cycle of communication. In order to be understood, one must play one’s role in the game, and this role is surreptitiously identified as a mark of belonging.

But identity is continually searching for its roots, and the place from whence the enunciation comes is often mistaken as one of natural origins: primeval and therefore undeniably true. The community, which is a place of communication (a place of exchange of signs conventionally charged of meaning), is mistaken as a natural place of belonging, and transformed into the primeval source of meaning. The temporary and transitional convention that gives meaning to signs is strengthened and transformed into the natural mark or motivated relation between sign and meaning.

Identity may be seen as the hardening of the inner map of orientation. Identity is the opposite of style, which is singularity and consciousness of the singularity, a map of orientation flexible and adaptable, retroactively changing. Style never has a normative feature, nor implies any kind of interdiction and punishment. Identity is a limitation (unconsciously realized) upon the possibility of comprehension and interaction. It is a useful limitation, of course, but it is dangerous to mistake it as a condition of authenticity and primeval belonging. It is the condition of mutual aggressiveness, of racism and violence, and fascism. Identity is based on a hypertrophic sense of the root, and it leads to the reclamation of belonging as criterion of truth and of selection.

Identity is the perceptual and conceptual device that gives us the possibility of knowledge, but sometimes we mistake this knowledge for a re-cognition. So we are led to believe that which we already know, that we possess a map thanks to our belonging. This can be useful sometimes, but it is dangerous to mistake our cultural map for the inner territory of belonging. Without a map, one gets lost, but getting lost is the beginning of the process of knowledge; it is the premise for creating any map.

In their book Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Resolution, the psychoanalysts Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch write that the repeated application of the same solution in drastically different conditions is a neurotic attitude which leads to pathological situations.

Observed within the context of the current global dynamic of deterritorialization–re-territorialization, such neuroticism emerges as a constitutive component of today’s world order. On the one hand, globalization and the acceleration of cultural and economic exchanges have increased the need for the flexible adaptation of conceptual and linguistic maps. Yet at the same time, paradoxically, the deterritorialization that globalization entails hugely intensifies the need for an identitarian shelter, the need for the confirmation of belonging. Here lies the identitarian trap which is leading the world towards the proliferation of points of identitarian aggressiveness: the return of concepts such as the homeland, religion and family as aggressive forms of reassurance and self-confirmation.

We can also read this dynamic in terms of technomutation and ethno-mutation. On the one hand, information technology has provoked the acceleration and intensification of semiotic exchanges, and on the other hand, the displacement of people and massive waves of economic and political migration have provoked an unprecedented change in the ethnic landscape of the territories, with all the concomitant cultural contamination and intermixing. In conditions of competition, these processes tend to excite the need for identitarian belonging, and to give way to identitarian aggressiveness.

According to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, universal history can be viewed as a process of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization is the passage from a space whose code is known to a new space, where that code loses its meaning, so that things become unrecognizable for anyone attempting to use the code that was produced by the previous territory. The history of capitalism is continuously producing effects of deterritorialization.

At the outset, capitalism destroyed the old relation between the individual and both the agricultural territory and the family. Subsequently, it jeopardized the national borders and created a global space of exchange and communication. Currently, it is jeopardizing the very relation between money and production, and opening the way to a new form of immaterial semiotization. As capitalism destroys all forms of identification, it frees the individuals from the limitations of identity, but simultaneously it provokes a sense of displacement, a sort of opacity that is attributable to the loss of previous meanings and emotional roots. As a result, capitalism ultimately provokes a need for reterritorialization, and a continual return of the past in the shape of national identities, ethnic identities, sexual identities, and so on.

Modern history is a process of forgetting that provokes an effect of anguish and that forces people to desperately hold onto some kind of memory. But memory has faded, together with the dissolution of the past, such that people have to invent a new set of memories. Like the character Rachel in the 1982 neo-noir sci-fi film Blade Runner, people create their own memories, putting together pieces of old texts, of faded images, of words whose meaning is lost.

‘Memory is right’, said Chaim Weizmann, when summoned to the Congress of Versailles by the victors of the Second World War, in reference to the right of Jewish people to reclaim the land of their ancestors.2

Weizmann’s assertion, which was fundamental for the creation of the state of Israel, today sounds like an arrogant provocation. Memory is not right, but it is part of an identity, and identity is not based on memory; rather, identity creates memory.

Milan Kundera writes the following about the future and the past:

People are always shouting they want to create a better future. It’s not true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is full of life, eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. The only reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past. They are fighting for access to the laboratories where photographs are retouched and biographies and histories rewritten.3

Contrary to common belief, the past is far from unchangeable. The past only exists in our minds, and therefore it takes new shapes as we distance ourselves from it, and as we displace the viewpoint from which we are remembering.

‘Memory is right’ was not only a provocation, it was a declaration of war, as different memories conflict. The creation of Israel is based on Weizmann’s contention that memory is right, and the never-ending war between Israel and Palestinians is based on the arbitrary identification of memory and right.

#### Despite their opposition to hegemony, they buy into Eurocentric discursive practices the reify exceptionalism and prevent genuine resistance

**Spanos 2K** [William, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamtom, *America’s Shadow*, 2000, p. 191-193]

What I have argued in this book about the relationship between philosophy and imperialism is that the euphoric annunciation of the end of history and the advent of the New World Order by the deputies of the dominant American culture at the end of the Cold War is symptomatic of the achievement of the global hegemony of "America" understood not simply as a political order, but as a way of thinking. I have claimed that this triumphant "American" way of thinking is not exceptionalist, as it has always been claimed by Americans, especially since de Tocqueville's announcement of the advent of democracy in America, but European, which means metaphysical: an imperial thinking, whose provenance resides in Roman antiquity, that sees the being into which it inquires as a totalized spatial image, a "field" or "region" or "domain" to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited.

But this way of putting this imperial metanarrative, though necessary in the context of the amnesiac imperatives of thinking the Enlightenment as an epochal emancipatory moment in world history, is too general.

It does not account for the historically specific transformation of this European mode of knowledge production accomplished in the wake of America's emergence as a global power: the fulfillment of the Enlightenment's "developmental model" in the effacement of the visible imperial logos informing traditional metaphysics by way of the apotheosis of the "objectivity" of empirical science and the advent of the classificatory table. Under the aegis of a triumphant America, the narrative economy of European metaphysics has come to its end in the form of a universal instrumentalism, a Man-centered thinking for which everything in time and space is seen as a "problem" that the larger comparative "picture" renders susceptible to a final and determinate solution.

In Heidegger's proleptic terms, European metaphysical thinking in the technological age dominated by America has become "Americanized," a "representational"/"calculative" thinking or "planning" that has transformed the uncalculability of being at large into a planetary "world picture":

"We get the picture" concerning something does not mean only that what is, is set before us, is represented to us, in general, but that what is stands before us — in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it — as a system. "To get the picture" throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped and prepared for it. Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirely, is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before himself and have before himself, and consequently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before himself. Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter.1

Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of modernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" —the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History — comes to be seen as the Pax Metaphysica: the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or disposable] reserve."2

This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commodity is everywhere manifest in the post-Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the lingua franca of the "free market," which has as one of its most devastating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures.

What for the purpose of my argument this global triumph of "American" thinking means is that even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the ontological grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose. They thus fulfill the expectation of the deputies of American culture who predict that "even nondemocrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard."3

That is to say, the fulfillment of the European metanarrative in the globalization of American technological thinking, that is, the Americanization of the planet, has tacitly reduced opposition to a resonant silence. It is in this sense that, with Heidegger, the intellectual who is attuned to the complicity between Western philosophy and imperialism is compelled to call this "age of the world picture" presided over by America a "destitute time" or, more suggestively, "a realm of in-between" — "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming."4

In the context of the impasse of oppositional thinking, in other words, he/she is compelled to acknowledge the time of the postCold War occasion as an interregnum. This, for an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking — the "shadow" that haunts its light — that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the marginalized intellectual is the rethinking of thinking itself. And, as I have suggested, it is the event of the Vietnam War — and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it — that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

#### The alternative is to theorize universality as central to struggle---that’s the only way to escape reactionary repetitions

McGowan 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Conclusion: Avoiding The Worst,” *Universality and Identity Politics*, Conclusion, ebook, dml)

Universalist projects always threaten to become seduced by the possibility of creating the universal into a full presence rather than discovering it as a necessary absence. In doing so, they succumb to terror. This is the perversion that universalism must constantly be on guard against. Whenever people insist on their ability to create a world of complete equality, we should recognize this perversion at work. Even if the perversion of universality is an unavoidable danger inherent in universalizing, it is nonetheless worth the risk. The alternative of total particularity is more murderous and barbaric than the Committee for Public Safety. This is why the solution cannot be a retreat into the confines of particularity.

Particularity does not exist without the absent universal that gives this particularity its sense. The universal is antecedent to the particular. The attempt to retreat from the danger of the universal to the security of a particular identity is doomed to fail. What’s more, the repression of universality for the sake of a full embrace of particularity leads to disaster.

Although it doesn’t appear as evident, the danger of the extreme particularity that capitalism produces is even more ominous than the gulag. The dangers of particularity have the advantage, however, of being much more difficult to discern than those of universality. This is why no one talks about the number of people killed under capitalism. The visibility of the gulag for us today contrasts with the invisibility of exploited laborers, racist institutions, and underlying misogyny that sustain the capitalist system. Although we don’t readily see the horrors that capitalism’s unbridled particularity unleashes, we must nonetheless pay attention to them when tallying up corpses.

When we examine the horrors of capitalism’s insistence on particularity, the leger of destruction ceases to seem so one-sided. The suffering perpetuated in the name of universality actually pales in comparison with what occurred quietly under the banner of particularism. From children working in sweatshops to millions living in favelas to the reign of military warlords, particularism destroys lives without even holding out the promise of universal freedom and equality. It does so in order that a few individuals can pursue the project of accumulation without restraint.

The destruction that capitalist particularity has perpetuated includes two world wars, when the capitalist insistence on particularity led to national identitarian conflicts that make the Reign of Terror look like a time of peace and prosperity. The violence of particularism doesn’t appear as part of an explicit project in the way that universalism does, which is why we don’t chalk it up to particularism or identity as such. The structure of particular violence—a particular identity commits it—ends up exculpating particularism because we blame the individual identity rather than the political philosophy of particularism (or the capitalist structure that demands it). Our judgment on particular identities like that of the Nazis rather than identity as such enables identity to get off scot-free from the judgment of history. When it comes to universalism, the situation is reversed, the blood that universalism sheds redounds to the universal itself, not to the individual actors who order the violence.

When one attributes the violence of two world wars to the capitalist insistence on particularity, this immediately raises questions. The violence that particularism produces seems like natural violence rather than the result of any political project.2 No one entered into the wars in the name of particularity itself but rather for the sake of national interest. This is the case even for the aggressors. But when one enacts violence for the sake of an identity, one is not acting naturally, since there is nothing natural about identity. Every claim about the natural status of violence conceals the particularity (and identitarian philosophy) performing the violence. Such violence always exists against the background of a particularist system and a particularist politics.

Blindness to the violence of particularism makes it easy to impugn universality and to envision political struggle without it. But without the appeal to universality, politics becomes nothing other than a battle between competing interests. When this situation arises, the strongest interest, the interest of capital itself, inevitably wins. The retreat into identity neither spares us from violence nor gives us a more secure route to emancipation. It does nothing but create the possibility for conservative rule.

For too long, politics around the world has been staged on right-wing terrain. We envision a particular world with particular causes. This image of politics leads inevitably to right-wing victories, even when moderates win elections. One cannot count the election of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, or Emmanuel Macron as a triumph for emancipation but as part of the contemporary conservative wave, despite the explicit political affiliation of these figures. In a world of competing particulars, there is no possibility for an emancipatory breakthrough.

But this is not the only possible way of envisioning political struggle. If we view political contestation as a struggle for the form that the universal will take, we are on the terrain of the Left and the project of emancipation. We don’t need to opt for the universal in one grand act but must begin to theorize universality as the fundamental stake in political contestation. The great leap forward consists in recognizing politics as the struggle between universality and particularity. Once we take this leap, we force the Right to play all their political games on the road. Unlike in football games, in a political struggle home field advantage always wins, and gaining this advantage depends on recognizing the role of universality in politics. The fight for emancipation must be a universal fight, or it cannot be won.

### 1NC---OFF

Nonviolence K

#### Advocating for violent disruption backfires---self-defense is a valid moral justification for those involved, but does not mean we should pro-actively advocate for it in strategy building spaces

Domhoff 5, Professor of Sociology at UC Santa Cruz (William, Social Movements and Strategic Nonviolence, www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/change/science\_nonviolence.html)

Violence-prone activists sometimes like to claim they are merely retaliating against violence by the police, which they think people will understand and even applaud as justifiable self-protection. Some activists also believe that standing up to the police will inspire others to join them because they have shown they are serious about challenging the system. However, as polls taken after such incidents show, most people do not accept these rationales. They do not like to hear of extreme reactions by the police, but they tend to blame the demonstrators, even when the police are the primary instigators. Thus, it is not a matter of who is right and who is wrong, or about which side started it. It is a matter of whether physical confrontations are effective in gaining adherents, and it seems clear that they are not. To be effective, nonviolence must be maintained in the face of great provocations, even beatings and murders by the opponents. If there is no retaliation, the perpetrators may be prosecuted, or public sentiment may switch to the side of the challengers. This is in fact in part what happened when police and vigilantes attacked civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s. Those unprovoked actions swung whites outside the South against police violence despite their continuing feelings of racial superiority, and forced the president and leaders in Congress to condemn elected officials and law enforcement personnel in the South.

#### Strategic nonviolence is better---spurs regime breakdown, increases participation, and spurs international condemnation---stats prove violence fails

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Strategic nonviolent resistance can be distinguished from principled nonviolence, which is grounded in religious and ethically based injunctions against violence. Although many people who are committed to principled nonviolence have engaged in nonviolent resistance (e.g., Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.), the vast majority of participants in nonviolent struggles have not been devoted to principled nonviolence.11 The **conflation** of nonviolent struggle with principled nonviolence, pacifism, passivity, weakness, or isolated street protests has contributed to **misconceptions** about this phenomenon.12 Although nonviolent resistors eschew the threat or use of violence, the “peaceful” designation often given to nonviolent movements **belies the often highly disruptive nature of organized nonviolent resistance**. Nonviolent resistance achieves demands **against the will of the opponent by seizing control of the conflict through widespread noncooperation and defiance**.13 Violent coercion threatens physical violence against the opponent.14 Scholars often **assume** that violent methods of resistance are the most coercive or the most likely to force accommodation, thereby producing desired policy changes.15 For instance, some have argued that terrorism is an effective strategy, particularly in forcing democratic regimes to make territorial concessions.16 In contrast, Max Abrahms has shown that terrorists’ success rates are extremely low, accomplishing their policy objectives **only 7 percent of the time**.17 Abrahms nevertheless concludes that actors choose terrorism because it is still more effective than nonviolent resistance.18 We argue that nonviolent resistance may have a **strategic advantage over violent resistance** for two reasons. **First**, repressing nonviolent campaigns may **backfire**. In backfire, an unjust act—often violent repression—recoils against its originators, often resulting in the **breakdown of obedience among regime supporters**, **mobilization** of the population against the regime, and **international condemnation** of the regime.19 The internal and external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns are thus higher than the costs of repressing violent campaigns. Backfire leads to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign, creating **dissent and conflicts among the opponent’s supporters**, increasing **external support** for the resistance campaign, and **decreasing external support** for the opponent. These dynamics are **more likely to occur** when an opponent’s violence is not met with violent counterreprisals by the resistance campaign and when this is communicated to internal and external audiences.20 The domestic and international repercussions of a violent crackdown against civilians who have publicized their commitment to nonviolent action are **more severe** than repression against those who could be **credibly labeled as “terrorists” or “violent insurgents.”**21 Internally, members of a regime—including civil servants, security forces, and members of the judiciary—are more likely to shift loyalty toward nonviolent opposition groups than toward violent opposition groups. The coercive power of any resistance campaign is enhanced by its tendency to prompt disobedience and defections by members of the opponent’s security forces, who are more likely to consider the negative political and personal consequences of using repressive violence against unarmed demonstrators than against armed insurgents.22 Divisions are more likely to result among erstwhile regime supporters, who are **not as prepared** to deal with mass civil resistance as they are with armed insurgents.23 Regime repression can also **backfire** through increased public mobilization. Actively involving a relatively larger number of people in the nonviolent campaign may bring **greater** and **more sustained pressure to bear** on the target, whereas the public may **eschew violent insurgencies** because of physical or moral barriers. Externally, the international community is **more likely to denounce and sanction** states for repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns. When nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sympathize with the cause, nonviolent campaigns are more appealing as aid recipients. External aid may or may not advance the cause of the campaign.24 The external costs of repressing nonviolent campaigns can be high, however, especially when the repression is captured by the media. External actors may organize sanctions against repressive regimes that repeatedly crack down on unarmed protestors.25 Although sanctions are possible in the case of violent insurgencies as well, they are less likely. Instead, some foreign states may actually aid a regime in crushing the violent insurgents. Other foreign states may lend material support to a violent resistance campaign in an attempt to advantage it against its opponent. Indeed, state sponsorship of violent insurgencies and terrorist groups has been an ongoing foreign policy dilemma for decades.26 Whether state-sponsored violent groups have succeeded in obtaining their strategic goals is unclear.

#### Vote neg to criticize violent resistance and endorse strategic nonviolence---the aff strengthens the government’s hand and immediately deteriorates quality of life---Palestine proves

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The absent critique The critique that one would hope to find among activists is around the **effects** of armed resistance both on Palestinian lives and on thePalestinian cause. The two are not necessarily the same and a positive contribution by armed resistance to the Palestinian cause may work to justify its disastrous results on Palestinian lives. However, I would argue that armed resistance has neither advanced the Palestinian cause nor protected Palestinian lives. On the contrary, it may have **strengthened Israel's hand to crush the Palestinians with impunity**. Ever since Hamas became confined to the Gaza Strip it has pursued the "cause" through inter alia armed means. It made no gains from this in the form of concessions from Israel; it did not liberate an inch of land and it did not reverseIsrael's cruel siege of Gaza. Meanwhile life in Gaza has **severely deteriorated** as a result of repeated military confrontations with Israel. Israel's latest war on Gaza "**eliminated what was left of the middle class**" and sent "**almost all of the population into destitution** and dependence on international humanitarian aid" (UNCTAD, 2015: 8). Compounding Israel's policies towards Palestinian infrastructure, environment and natural resources, which had rendered Gaza nearly uninhabitable (United Nations, 2012), the armed resistance has proven **immensely costly** to the Palestinians. As such, one might expect an energetic debate about it among those involved in advocating for Palestinian rights. For example, efforts could be made to amplify the voices of Palestinians opposed to armed resistance. Campaigns could be launched to publicly dissociate from Hamas's and other armed groups' tactics so as to discourage support for their methods. In particular a debate could be extended on the use of nonviolence for the attainment of political goals, as famously put forth by Gene Sharp (1973). Maintaining nonviolent discipline, according to Sharp's theory of "political jiu-jitsu", can bolster the view that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is deeply unfair and must be countered. When Hamas launches rockets at Israel it **diminishes perceptions** of the conflict as lopsided; indeed the rockets may give the false impression that Palestinians can defend themselves. Yes, of course Israel would find ways to undermine an exclusively nonviolent resistance strategy -- oppressive regimes often do. Here advancements in nonviolent theory such as the "backfire" method whereby activists anticipate the oppressor's response to nonviolent mobilzation and **take action to make it backfire** could be discussed by activists (Martin, 2015). And although usual acts of nonviolent resistance such as demonstrations, boycotts and sit-ins would not work in Gaza since it is deprived of direct contact with Israel and the world, alternative acts of protest and civil disobedience could be explored and made possible by collaboration with activists on the outside through the use of information technologies and other means. Moreover, debates with regard to activists' vision for the cause must interrogate the role of armed resistance. Many activists have proposed a vision of a single state in Israel/Palestine in which all would enjoy equal social and political rights while at the same time ensuring just redress for injustices incurred (Abunimah et al, 2007). Although many SMOs engaged in the movement do not officially take a position on the one/two-state debate, campaigners have increasingly argued that the two-state solution is no longer attainable given the number of Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas. In this context, conferences advocating for one democratic state have become more common (Farsakh, 2011)1. Debates in this area remain at the theoretical level and have not defined the means of reaching the one state goal. The continuation of armed confrontation between Israel and Palestinian groups is likely detrimental to the prospects of a single democratic state. However this, to my knowledge, has not been addressed. On the contrary, there is confusing discourse around campaigns such as BDS that seems to leave the door open to armed resistance. For example, in an assessment of BDS in the Palestinian publication Al Majdal, one author warned of the "dogma" of nonviolence that could come to plague BDS and asserted that "violent and nonviolent tactics have always co-existed as forms of resistance and they are likely to do so in the future" (Sultany, 2013: 15-16). Nonviolent discourse among Palestine activists, according to Sultany, "has become more fashionable today since it resonates with Western perspectives" (Sultany, 2013: 15). This sort of talk **needs to be challenged** by a healthy and rigorous debate on the real merits of committing to unarmed methods. I provide further examples of Arab commentators who criticize nonviolence in a later section. For now, suffice it to say that **evading criticism** of armed resistance has become the norm among many people active in the movement, as I demonstrate in the next section.

### 1NC---OFF

Economization K

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Their description of policy debate as a monopoly and debate as a ‘market economy’ is reason alone to reject the 1AC. They assume human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms, securing capitalism’s hegemony.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### The economization of life has given rise to the Econocene---an unsustainable period of ecological collapse sustained by economism as the dominant secular religion. The Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

Richard B. Norgaard 19, Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley, “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/Norgaard87.pdf

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

#### The alternative is to become critically aware of the generative force of metaphor. We can accept the 1AC, but must reject their marketized language.

Michael Augustín 15, postgraduate student of PhD. program at Department of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, “The Market Metaphor As an Issue of Political Language and Practice,” Czech Journal of Political Science, March 2015.

2. Defining Approach

A metaphor is a figure of speech that is often employed in political theory and political practice. It is not peculiar to politics as a social science, though: metaphors may guide our understanding of complex, difficult relationships in any domain. But they may also mislead. Because of this, examining their impact takes on urgency, and this is what we do in the text that follows. The Czech political scientist Petr Drulák speaks of metaphor in politics in terms of discursive structures, i.e., customary rules that impact the discourse itself (Drulák 2009: 59). Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By suggest that metaphor is more than simply a speech act or poetic ornament. Rather than being a purely linguistic phenomenon, it pertains directly to our thoughts and actions: how we think and behave is largely influenced by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–4). An example they cite, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ is a perfect example, and confirms that the way we perceive a particular activity impacts how we perform it.

The use of metaphor is thus in no way neutral. Metaphor has a determining influence over our understanding of particular situations. It frames the subject and decides how we think about a topic area. Individual metaphors organize our thoughts and actions and become a substitute for thought and analysis, but often gain uncritical acceptance and harbour certain perils (Patterson 1998: 221). They function to suppress certain aspects of a situation and emphasize others, thus shaping meaning in a way that justifies particular actions or sanctions particular acts, or simply aids in choosing goals (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142).

Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikalo confirm that metaphors such as ‘branches of government’ and ‘head of state’ used in describing political situations and processes influence our political perceptions (Carver, Pikalo 2008: 1). Jonathan Charteris-Black develops the argument that in political contexts, metaphor is used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations; metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings (Charteris-Black 2011: 32) and thereby contribute to myth creation (Charteris-Black 2011: 28). Metaphor is typically used in persuasion and frequently employed in the language of rhetoric and argumentation, such as in political speeches (Charteris-Black 2004: 7). But its use does not end there. It has proven an impressive tool for academic research. But it may happen that the researcher becomes so entranced by the clarity and simplicity of argumentation that metaphor offers that he or she overlooks deeper connections in the phenomenon under study.

Before we examine the central issue in this study, we must first differentiate between the concepts of analogy and metaphor as used in this paper. By ‘analogy’ we shall intend a perceived similarity between two entities. The ‘metaphor’ is a higher-level mapping of these similarities that is used to communicate them in the form of a figure of speech. In the current context, the logic is as follows: if in political discourse we speak of politics as a market, we have created a metaphor based on the similarity of properties. If instead we observe that politics involves a competition for voters just as the market mechanism embodies a competition for customers, or that catallactic (i.e. exchange) patterns obtain in politics as they do in the economic market, we have spelled out a concrete similarity and in so doing have pointed out an analogy. Thus, we are analyzing specific similarities between the marketplace and the political system, which we may term analogies, that are subsumed under the market metaphor.

The metaphor may be imagined simply as a set and the analogies it implies as a subset of that metaphor. In a typical deduction, the premises taken together may be said to form a set. Syllogistic reasoning is applied using this set of two or more propositions asserted or assumed to be true to arrive at a conclusion. We may consider an analogy to be a premise (‘politics is an exchange’, ‘politics is a competition’). The metaphor is then the argument, and is more complex (‘politics functions as an economic market’). Metaphors always implicitly contain a set of analogies that state some A is like B. A set of such analogies therefore creates the metaphor A is B. We know of no other scholar who works with metaphor and analogy in this particular formulation, but we consider the distinction between analogy and metaphor to be justified.

The approach to metaphor and analogy presented here is complementary to that given in Donald Schön’s Generative Metaphor: a Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy. The operation of the economic metaphor in politics shares common ground with Schön’s generative metaphors. His topic is social policy, and he notes that social policy has more to do with how we frame the objective to be achieved than it does with the selection of the optimal means to achieve it (Schön 1993: 138). ‘Such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’, but with various ways of making sense of reality’ (Schön 1993: 149). Inadequate metaphors inevitably give rise to insidiously inadequate solutions, because some are based on an inappropriate or simplistic understanding of the situation.

Generative metaphor is generative in the sense that it generates new perceptions and explanations, and invents reality. So not all metaphors are generative (Schön 1993: 142). But the market metaphor in politics does generate new perceptions and provide new insight into the political process. It is obvious that Schön is aware of the inherent risk that generative metaphors bear, and he calls for critical analysis to uncover their non-analogical connections: ‘The notion of generative metaphor then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase the rigor and precision of our analysis of social policy problems by examining the analogies and ‘disanalogies’ between the familiar descriptions’ (Schön 1993: 138–139)

## ON

#### Their understanding of a Settler-Native antagonism is overly essentializing and reifies the colonial project.

Sharma, 15—Director, International Cultural Studies Program, University of Hawai’i Manoa (Nandita, “Strategic Anti-Essentialism: Decolonizing Decolonization,” *Sylvia Wynter: Being Human as Praxis*, Chapter 7, pg 170-180, dml) [“nos”=Latin for “we”/“us”]

Emerging in the post–World War II era, indigeneity is a relatively recent mode of representation, one that encompasses very diverse people across the Americas, indeed across the world, often under a single, shared subjective understanding of being the “first” to live in any particular place.22 Being indigenous is a form of co- identification among people who previously did not see any connection with one another. It is also a way of laying claim to particular lands (or, more accurately, territories) on the basis of having (or having once had) specialized knowledge of that place. Yet, this mode of representation, however new or potentially expansive, remains particularistic. Indigeneity is a form of subjectivity that emerged because of the devastation wrought in the aftermath of 1492. Moreover, it is a form of subjectivity that interpellates people into efforts to gain national sovereignty within the global system of national states. Indigenous, then, as a mode of representation includes the often unacknowledged elision between native as a colonial state category of subjugation and indigenous as a category of resistance.

Indigenous conceptualized as such retains two interrelated problems that ensure that the kinds of unequal relationships organized in the aftermath of 1492 are reproduced. First, by denying the social constitution of the category of indigenous, it disavows people’s now-long history of connectivity across (and sometimes against) this category. Because this connectivity challenges the particularistic nature of indigeneity, recognition of interrelationality is itself represented as a threat. Second, by continuing to limit the criteria of membership of each nos, each is unable to accept as co-specifics those who are rendered as always-already oppositional others. Indeed, in making any particularistic nos, the significance of omitting certain others cannot be underestimated.

The category of indigenous, thus, does a sort of political work. It produces a particular nos (and thus a particular Other-to-indigenous nos).23 For some (though certainly not all) of those currently constituted as indigenous, it seems that one of the consequences of the enormously uneven Columbian exchange is the denunciation of the process of exchange itself. Today, the movement of life, plants, humans, and other animals is often cited as the cause for the devastation wrought on their native equivalent.24 Rather than focus on the hierarchical and exploitative relations of the Columbian exchange, some assume that the cause of the problem was / is mobility itself. Within such a worldview, that which moves is consequently denounced as inherently polluting, and, in an idiom that is gaining in popularity, movement and migration are posited as inherently colonizing.

An understanding of mobility as always colonizing is evident in the expansion of the term “settler colonist” to include all those deemed nonnative in any given space. Recently, within both indigenous studies and social movements for indigenous rights, the historical distinctions between the voyages of Columbus (and other colonizers) and those of slaves who survived the Middle Passage, indentured workers recruited in the wake of slavery’s abolition, and present- day migrants captured in a variety of state categories ranging from illegal to immigrant, have been collapsed. All, it is claimed, are agents of colonialism. It seems, then, that as there has been an expansion in the subjective understanding of people as indigenous, there has been a subsequent expansion in their other. Put differently, within some indigenous systems of belonging, all past and present people constituted as migrants are situated as colonizers.

In our present “great age” of migration, how did “colonizer” become a meaningful way to describe people who move across space?25 Indeed, how did “colonizer” come to be an increasingly dominant mode of representing indigenous people’s others, others who were once understood as cocolonized people or, at least, not as an oppositional other? Is there a relationship between these particularistic modes of representation and the false separation and hierarchical ranking of different but related experiences of colonization, such as the processes of expropriation and people’s displacement across space?

The answers to these questions lie within the logics of autochthonous systems of representation and the ways in which claims to indigeneity bring to life discourses of alienness or foreignness. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff argue, by “elevating to a first-principle the ineffable interests and connections, at once material and moral, that flow from ‘native’ rootedness, and special rights, in a place of birth,” autochthonous discourses place those constituted as natives at the top of a hierarchy of the exploited, oppressed, and colonized and insist on the centrality of the claims of natives for the realization of either decolonization or justice.26 Within the negative duality of natives and nonnatives that such discourses put into play, origins (and, in some contexts, claims of original, versus later, human discovery or inhabitation) become the key determinant of who belongs in any given space today—and who does not.

The quintessential alien or foreigner within autochthonous discourses is the figure of the migrant. This is because the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be a migrant in today’s world is one where migration is seen as movement away from one’s native land. Thus, migrants come to stand as the ultimate nonnative. Such a move works to shift the focus from a dialectics of colonialism—where the key historical dynamic is one of expropriation and exploitation, and the key relationship is one between the colonizers and the colonized—to one where the dichotomy between native and nonnative becomes central to both analysis and politics. Patrick Wolfe, a historian of Australia, captures this perspective well in his claim that “the fundamental social divide is not the color line. It is not ethnicity, minority status, or even class. The primary line is the one distinguishing Natives from settlers—that is, from everyone else. Only the Native is not a settler. Only the Native is truly local. Only the Native will free the Native. One is either native or not.”27

From such an autochthonous perspective, being native is both spatially and temporally dependent. Temporally, migrants may be identified as natives at some point in time and in some given space, but once having moved away from the spaces where such representations may be claimed, they become nonnatives. Spatially, migrants remain native but only to the places they no longer live in. Thus, some argue that migrants can continue to claim native rights to places they have moved from if they are able to show genealogical descendance from those with native status in that space.28 Candace Fujikane, in dismissing Asian claims to belong in the United States, puts it this way: “Indigenous people are differentiated from settlers by their genealogical, familial relationship with specific land bases that are ancestors to them. One is either indigenous to a particular land base or one is not. Asian Americans are undeniably settlers in the United States because we cannot claim any genealogy to the land we occupy, no matter how many lifetimes Asian settlers work on the land, or how many Asian immigrants have been killed through racist persecution and hate crimes, or how brutal the political or colonial regimes that occasioned Asians’ exodus from their homelands.”29

In this logic, indigeneity is racialized/ethnicized, and in the process, land—or more accurately, territory—is as well. Natives, it is assumed, belong in “their” native land and only there. Further, who can be recognized as native is dependent upon ancestry, thereby adding blood to the discourse of soil. Descent becomes of further importance in this distinction, for many indigenous people are, of course, also Asian (and European and African and so on) as well as vice versa. It is one’s ability to claim some indigenous ancestor that can allow one to be seen as indigenous today. While such claims can be social and not biological, many indigenous groups, following from certain governments’ own categorical recognition of indigeneity, rely on some form of blood quantum rule that requires a minimal indigenous lineage. Not surprisingly, such criteria for belonging (and for the rights and entitlements of membership) have not always worked for those subordinated through other axes of oppression and exploitation. Thus, many women have found that their claims to native status are often the first to be discounted.30

In this, there is an ironic historical continuity of autochthonous ideas and practices of belonging and the underlying logics of the colonial (and, in some places, postcolonial) state. Indeed, the meaning of native was one that was used to distinguish the colonized from the colonizer so that the natives could be represented as less human and, therefore, as legitimately colonized. Being native, then, was a signifier of being colonized and the ultimate signifier of abjectness. Nativeness as a mode of representation, then, was designed to institutionalize the new racist orders implemented by different colonial empires. Importantly, all colonized people were variously identified as “the” natives in order to signal their lack of membership in the propter nos of the colonizers.31

In the post–World War II era of postcolonialism, when, through much struggle, colonial empires were removed from the list of legitimate forms of political rule, the right to claim rights within and to any given space came, increasingly, to be seen as belonging to “the” natives. After all, we were told, the anticolonial project was often posited as fighting for the rule of the natives for the natives. Not surprisingly, then, the battle over resources and over place has, thus, increasingly become one about the meaning of nativeness.

In this way, autochthonous modes of belonging are significant in advancing particular nationalized regimes of rights, for the national subject is often defined through an exclusive racialized / ethnicized criteria through which political rights and rights to property, especially social property rights in land and natural resources, are to be apportioned within any claimed national space. Contemporary, postcolonial forms of racism are often based on ideas of autochthony. All those who are said to have migrated to the places where they live (or who cannot prove their prior inhabitance) are increasingly viewed as agents of (instead of co- victims of) colonial projects. The ruling ideology of nationalism has provided an explanation for belonging and has come to be a key way to distinguish between who is properly native to any given place and who is not. Today, the rhetoric of autochthony is evident throughout the world, including diverse sites in Europe, southern Africa, Central Africa, Latin America, North America, and the Pacific. Significantly, such a discourse spans the political spectrum from the Right to the Left. Here, I focus on the emergence of autochthonous discourses in indigenous nationalist politics (engaged in by both natives and nonnatives) in the territories claimed by Canada and the United States, with a particular focus on the Hawaiian archipelago, where this discourse is well rehearsed.

The position that all migrants are settler colonists has been advanced in a number of recent scholarly works in Canada and the United States. In the context of Hawai’i, it has been argued that “Asians” in Hawai’i (most of whom are the descendants of contractually indentured plantation laborers who began arriving in the mid- 1800s) are “settler colonists,” active in the colonization of native Hawaiians due to their nonnative status.32 The main distinction between the two groups, they argue, is that native Hawaiian claims are based on rights of national sovereignty over “their land, water, and other economic and legal rights,” while Asians, because they are not native, have no right to make such claims.33

In a Canadian context, Bonita Lawrence’s and Enakshi Dua’s article “Decolonizing Antiracism” (2005) in Social Justice makes some of the same arguments made by the contributors to the special issue of Amerasia Journal on “Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai’i.”34 Like them, Lawrence and Dua also focus on those nonnatives who are nonwhite. They contend that the antiracist praxis of nonwhites has “contribute[d] to the active colonization of Aboriginal peoples.”35 Indeed, they contend that “antiracism is premised on an ongoing colonial project” and on “a colonizing social formation.”36 Postcolonial critiques of national liberation strategies, social constructivist critiques of the naturalness of races or nations, and arguments against ethnic absolutism, such as those made by Stuart Hall, become, for them, examples of how antiracism is a colonial practice.37 Lawrence and Dua maintain that these kinds of analyses colonize indigenous people by “contribut[ing] to the ongoing delegitimization of Indigenous nationhood.”38

In these essays, then, critiques of nationalisms or of the naturalization of social categories are tantamount to attacks against indigenous people. It is in such assertions that we can find the ideological character of autochthonous discourses. In arguing for the theoretical and political centrality of nativeness, there is an effort to depoliticize native nationalisms. By insisting that any critique of nationalism is tantamount to a colonial practice, the nationalist assumptions and politics of native nationalisms are taken out of the realm of that which can be contested. Consequently, native nationalisms are posited as the only strategy for decolonization.

It is precisely the nationalism inherent within autochthonous discourses that helps to explain not only why all nonnatives are conceptualized as colonizers but also why the (varied) critics of nationalism (or those who argue for the social basis for ideas of race and ethnic purity, or those who uncover a politics of solidarity across such lines) are also colonizers. Negatively racialized persons, in this logic of nationalized self- determinacy, are relegated to being mere minorities of various nations and their existing or hoped- for national sovereign states. Thus, because they are not a people / nation as defined by hegemonic doctrines of self- determinancy, Asians, for example, in Hawai’i, or elsewhere in the United States and Canada, are represented as not- colonized and, therefore, in the dualistic mode of autochthonous representations, as colonizers.

Within autochthonous discourses one can only be colonized if they “belong” or are indigenous to that space itself. In this view, the colonization that people experience supposedly ends once one moves away from the colony (or, now, the postcolony). Instead, these migrants come to be represented as colonizers. Because a key aspect of the subjective understanding of indigenous is being a colonized person, only other colonized persons can be seen to be co-specifics. Neither those constituted as migrants nor their struggles can be perceived as part of anticolonial struggles. As such, they cannot be included as commensurate human beings within any colonial or postcolonial space.

This view imagines the space of colonialism as finite. It fails to see the broader field of power that processes of colonialism opened up. More specifically, it fails to see migration as a part of the colonial experience. The world as seen through an autochthonous lens is one of discrete, disconnected spaces, each belonging to its native people. This is the autochthonous view of the world prior to colonization and of the ideal decolonized space. It thus appears that as borders and relationships begin to realign to allow for new forms of subjective understanding and conspecificity, some scholars and activists are actively working to re- fix borders and territories through particularistic strategies of identification. The new mode of representation of indigeneity, which, ostensibly, appears to be an expansion in subjective understanding, creates a Manichaean dualism of native and nonnative. Such a logics of representation assumes that all past and present processes of exchange are inherently destructive. Colonialism, from such a view, was (and remains) about people moving about and that it was / is in this process of moving away from where they are native to places where they are not that has caused the enormous destruction of life. By casting all human mobility as colonial acts, autochthonous modes of representation, ironically, empty out from the meaning of colonialism the enormous violence that has been done by colonizers. It also minimalizes—or even denies—the violence done to people who moved and who move today.

Borders, including the borders between natives and nonnatives, although seemingly about the physical separation of those in the national nos from its foreign others, then, are primarily concerned with making differences within the same space that the nos and its others both live in. Because we—and, with Sylvia Wynter, I use “we” in all the fullness of the term “humans”—have long lived in a world that is connected across now-demarcated spaces, making claims to land, to livelihoods, and to belonging on the basis of particularistic claims, such as a racialized national membership, only works to ensure that the oppressions and exploitations wrought in the aftermath of 1492 are maintained, albeit in new guises.

Conclusion

Autochthonous discourses present the Columbian exchange as a zerosum game between putative “groups” of natives and nonnatives. Neglected within such discursive modes of representation is the fact that the gross inequalities engendered by this exchange were structured not by some inherent struggle between natives and nonnatives but by a set of struggles between expropriators and the expropriated, the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed. Tragically, these struggles were won by those who cemented their victory in a set of social relations that institutionalized private property, an ever- expanding capitalist mode of production, colonial, and then national, state power, and an interlocking web of ranked hierarchies formed around ideologies of the noncommensurability of humans through ideas of “race,” gender, “nation,” and citizenship. Each of these has been normalized to the extent that even (some of) the expropriated, exploited, and oppressed people on earth have come to identify with these ideologies instead of with each other.

However, if we understand the New World not simply as a mistaken formulation of Columbus imagining himself in the western part of India but one that brought the four hemispheres together in a global field of power, we come to see that the New World was made in and across multiple geographic sites. The moments of New World invention necessarily involved people across the planet and came into being not suddenly, in 1492, but over a longer period through which “European” elites expanded the territories they controlled and responded to the incredible consolidation and spread of capitalism. Indeed, as Sylvia Wynter well shows, the shorthand of “1492” does not capture the fact that the processes leading to the colonization of people in the Caribbean and Americas were begun by much earlier imperial ventures in the Middle East, western Mediterranean, eastern Atlantic and West Africa.39 Encounters here established a specific pattern of relations that were to be extended not only to the Caribbean and Americas but, importantly, within the space of what we now call Europe.

The New World, then, was forged through processes that people across space and time would be able to recognize. Marcus Rediker calls these processes the “four violences”: the expropriation of the commons both in Europe and in the Americas; African slavery and the Middle Passage; the exploitation and the institution of wage labor; and the repression organized through prisons and the criminal justice system.40 Silvia Federici adds to our understanding of these shared experiences by showing that the persecution of women and the containment of their liberty (especially during various and ongoing hunts for witches) were crucial elements in the Columbian exchange.41

People’s shared experience of the terror of expropriation, exploitation, and oppression led to their shared resistance, something, unfortunately, left unexamined within Wynter’s oeuvre.42 Neither the ruling- class version of colonization- as- progress nor the autochthonous view that colonization was caused by “foreigners” entering native spaces tells us this story. Recent work by social historians, such as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, or political theorists such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, however, show that there was indeed a serious struggle over the terms of what is now (too ahistorically and uniformly) often called “modernity.”43 That capitalists were victorious in this struggle should not blind us to the fact that they did not instigate the revolution (or the “root expansion in thought” that Sylvia Wynter discusses in relation to Columbus’s challenging of medieval European notions of space). The bourgeoisie, instead, were part of the counterrevolution against those actively challenging extant forms of ruling in Europe, including challenges to the medieval idea of transcendent power of all sorts (church, God, king / queen).

The actual revolutionaries were derisively called the multitude or the motley crew and were composed of the rural commoners, urban rioters, fishers, market women, weavers, and many others who mobilized countless rebellions to realize their immanent demand that producers fully realize the fruits of their labor, and do so on earth.44 As the spread of ruling relations moved across the planet, so too did communities committed to revolution. When the imperial elites in Europe expanded their territorial claims—and processes of expropriation and exploitation to the Caribbean, the Americas, and the rest of the planet—new communities of resistance across these spaces were formed on the basis of radical solidarities. Revolutionaries from spaces now imagined separately as Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific encountered one another and, in many cases, saw in each other’s experiences a desire for their own common emancipation.

The motley crew, then, was very much a cluster of new world formations—new world because they stretched across the entire global field of power of expanding imperial states. They explicitly challenged emergent discourses of their innate noncommensurability, be it racialized, nationalized, or gendered lines of difference. As a result, as Linebaugh and Rediker uncover, these solidarities were considered as the greatest threat against the aspirations of the newly emerging elites—the traders, ship owners, slave owners, plantation owners, and leaders of imperial states. Significantly, it was ideas—and subjective identifications—of nation, race, and gender that severely weakened this “many-headed hydra” and set back its revolution.

It is precisely this revolution, this “root expansion in thought,” that Sylvia Wynter ignites with her call for a human species–wide sense of conspecificity. In her essay “1492: A New World View,” Sylvia Wynter creates an imaginative space for a new and expansive subjective understanding of who “we” are so that we can undo the continued exclusionary, uneven, and purposefully divisive legacy of 1492. While those who shamelessly celebrate the aftermath of 1492 continue to believe that they can act unilaterally and with impunity against groups they have identified as native and migrants with no consequence to their own lives, and while some native nationalists believe that the nos of natives is a liberatory one that will lead to a postcolonial state of their own, Wynter’s “new world view” allows us to see that both partial perspectives are ideological. Neither reflects the lived experiences of people the world over, which are organized through both shared experience and tangible connection. As a result, neither is able to seize the revolutionary promise of an expansion in our empathic and affective ties with those with whom we live our lives.

Wynter, by defining humanness as a social, historical, and discursive coproduction rather than merely a biological one, urges us to become cognitive revolutionaries, to see our potential to forge social relationships with one another—relationships that recognize not only the massive changes wrought by the events following Columbus’s voyage of 1492 but also the possibility of what we can do with these changes. The New World produced new social formations, and it is within these social formations that struggles for decolonization have taken place and continue to and need to take place. This does not mean that we must make a choice between the celebrants’ universality, which is little but a parochial concern of elites, or the alternative of dissidents that romanticizes an essentialized “community” set in battle against its others. Rather, we can, if we choose, reject both views and reorient ourselves—and respatialize ourselves—with one afforded to us by the world that we have inherited, a world wrought with strife and inequality but a single world, nonetheless. This project is and always has been, by necessity, a shared one. Indeed, the making of new social bodies is not an epistemological problem but an ontological one. It is in the ontological unity of our human intra-actions that we can come into being what we already are: a species of humans, one, no less, that is intimately involved with all other life on our shared planet.

#### That reifies a totalizing understandings of settlerism that doom alt solvency and perpetuates the violence of labor exploitation

Busbridge, 18—Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018, dml)

The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007). Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes, under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7). The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’. Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

#### It conflates destruction of white property with change in the world---that’s wrong and backfires

Peter Dorman 16, faculty member in political economy at the Evergreen State College, 5/16/16, “The Climate Movement Needs to Get Radical, but What Does that Mean?,” http://nonsite.org/editorial/the-climate-movement-needs-to-get-radical-but-what-does-that-mean

3. The left has adapted to powerlessness. This Changes Everything practically exudes triumphalism, especially in the final hundred pages or so. Vibrant, righteous movements are springing up everywhere, we are told, and through their proliferation they will change the world.

Except, of course, they won’t. They do not have the means to change the world to something different, only to obstruct the bits of the existing world they can get their bodies in front of. That is important to do, and it can play a crucial role in a larger movement to contest power—if that movement can come into existence. If no larger movement arises, the local fires will be put out one by one. A radical political vision cannot abjure politics, and it is politics which is missing from Klein.

Here it is necessary to step back and consider the historical context. In the English-speaking world, and to a lesser extent in other wealthy, capitalist countries, the past several decades have seen profound defeat and demobilization on the left. In no country is there a mass political party with a program to transform the existing political economic order into something else. Unions, where they have any clout at all, have been fighting a rearguard struggle to retain as many of the gains of former times as they can. Of course, there have also been substantial victories for racial, gender and other social equalities and a general drift toward less authoritarian cultural norms. But the core institutions of wealth and power are more firmly entrenched now than they have been in generations, and the left as a political force is hardly noticeable.

How have those who still identify with the left coped with this epoch of powerlessness? There are many answers, but all of them express some form of disengagement. For instance, redefining politics as the performance of moral virtue rather than the contest for power can provide consolation when political avenues appear to be blocked. Activities of this sort are evaluated according to how expressive they are—how good they make us feel—rather than any objective criterion of effectiveness in achieving concrete goals or altering the balance of political forces. This is how I would interpret Blockadia, for instance, in the absence of a broader movement that includes both direct action and political contestation: Klein can devote page after page to how righteous these activists are without any attention to whether they have had or have any prospect of having an impact on carbon emissions. Their very activism constitutes its own victory, which is convenient if the more conventional sort of victory is believed to be out of reach. (It is bad form to even bring this up: why, some will ask, am I dwelling on the negative with so much positive energy to celebrate?)

Another response is to collapse social change into personal choices over lifestyle and philosophy. If you believe that the threat of climate change can be defeated by a shift to more modest consumption habits and rejection of the false intellectual gods of globalization and economic growth, one individual at a time, then each moment of conversion constitutes its own little victory. The reader of Klein’s book, feeling a sense of unity with that consciousness and its program to downshift consumption, can experience this victory first hand. This is very gratifying, and it reinforces the message that powerlessness in conventional terms is irrelevant, since the change we are part of is at a deeper level than governments and their laws or corporations and their assets. After all, what can be more subversive than thinking new thoughts?

One of Klein’s favorite adaptations is the conflation of wishes and operative political programs. Again and again she holds up statements of intent—protect Mother Earth, treat all people equally, respect all cultures, live simple, natural, local lives—as if they were proposals whose implementation would have these outcomes. It’s all ends and no means. This is a double convenience: first it eliminates the need to be factual and analytical about programs, since announcing the goal is sufficient unto itself, and second, it evades the disconcerting problem of how to deal with the daunting political challenge of getting such programs (if they even exist) enacted and enforced. I believe the treatment of goals as if they were programs is the underlying reason for the sloppiness of this book on matters of economics and law. Klein can say we should finance a large green investment program by taxing fossil fuel profits, or we should simultaneously shrink the economy and increase the number of jobs, because in the end it doesn’t matter whether these or other recommendations could actually prove functional in the real world. The truth lies in the rightness of the demand, not the means of fulfilling it. But this too is an adaptation to powerlessness.

To close, I wish to emphasize that this critique is ultimately not directed at a single individual. On the contrary, even if we consider only this one book, it is clear that its writing was a team effort; the long acknowledgments section identifies both paid assistants and an army of internal reviewers. But what I find diagnostic is the warm reception it received from virtually every media outlet on the English-speaking left. This suggests that Klein is moving with the political tide and not against it, and that the problems that seemed obvious to me were either invisible to her reviewers or regarded as too insignificant to bring up. The view that capitalism is a style of thinking, progress is a myth, and political contestation is irrelevant to “true” social change belongs not just to this one book but to all the commentators who found nothing to criticize. That’s the real problem.

#### Their theory of indigenous relationality is rooted in negative identity, which traps the aff in endless reactionary cycles

Brown 95 (Wendy, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). pp. 69-71)

Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction – the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds – and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought:

Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.

If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the ''imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds. " This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does" (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. "

But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection.' This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."

Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reaction to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political [failure] ~~paralysis~~, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach - "punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical he it creates a good conscience for itself" than to find venues of self-affirming action.

#### Those who fail to meet up to their nihilist model leads to color-checking and a new standard of “recognizable ethnicity”

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Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. So what am I, in the end? I am whatever you want me to be: oppressor, oppressed, cracker, spic, enemy, friend, White, Black, lover, fighter, masculine, effeminate, strong, weak, dead or alive. Just know that with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard (see Gherovici, 2003), I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable. Something Real. For you I’ll become a Hispanic hysteric, screeching Foucault (1972) with each symptom, with each episode of acting out, “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. In that sense I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.

#### The mythological grouping of all indigenous groups with land justifies romantic myths about cultural identities that provoke militarization and scapegoating---their alternative frame forecloses treating the globe as a commons where no identity is entitled to any land ownership is crucial to build the institutions capable of solving both the assault on Native peoples worldwide and global environmental catastrophe

**Dean 15** [Jodi, Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “This Changes Some Things,” March 17. 2015, *Politics, Theory, Action,* <http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2015/03/this-changes-some-things.html>]

The second problem is Klein's association of communities with indigeneity and land. Klein writes, "communities with strong ties to the land have always, and will always, defend themselves against businesses that threaten their ways of life" (309). Here again she denies division, as if everyone in a community agreed on what constituted a threat, as if they were all similarly situated against a threat, as if they were never too deluded, tired, or exploited to defend themselves, as if they could never themselves constitute a threat to themselves. Cities, towns, states, and regions make bad decisions all the time; they stimulate industries that destroy them. Klein, though, has something else in mind, "a ferocious love" that "no amount of money can extinguish." She associates this love "with an identity, a culture, a beloved place that people are determined to pass on to their grandchildren, and that their ancestors may have paid for with great sacrifice." She continues, "And though this kind of connection to place is surely strongest in Indigenous communities where the ties to the land go back thousands of years, it is in fact Blockadia's defining feature" (342). Participants in my seminar found this description racist or fascist. Even though this is not Klein's intent, her rhetoric deploys a set of myths regarding nature, and some people's relation to nature, that make some people closer to nature (and further from civilization) than others. It also justifies an intense defense of blood and soil on the part of one group's attachment to a place such that others become foreign, invaders, rightly excluded as threats to our way of life, our cultural identity. Given that climate change is already leading to increased migration and immigration and that the US and Europe are already responding by militarizing borders, a language of cultural defense and ties to the land is exactly what we don't need in a global movement for climate justice. Klein's argument, though, gets worse as it juxtaposes indigenous people's love of place with the "extreme rootlessness" of the fossil fuel workforce. These "highly mobile" pipefitters, miners, engineers, and big rig drivers produce a culture of transience, even when they "may stay for decades and raise their kids" in a place. The language of rootless echoes with descriptions of cosmopolitan Jews, intellectuals, and communists. Some are always foreign elements threatening our way of life. In contrast, I imagine climate politics as breaking the link between place and identity. To address climate change, we have to treat the world itself as a commons and build institutions adequate to the task of managing it. I don't have a clear idea as to what these institutions would look like. But the idea that no one is entitled to any place seems better to me as an ethos for a red-green coalition. It requires us to be accountable to every place.

#### Totalizing refusal of liberalism prevents effective challenges to power

Shulman 21—teaches political theory at The Gallatin School of New York University (George, “Fred Moten’s Refusals and Consents: The Politics of Fugitivity,” Political Theory, Vol. 49(2), 272–313, dml) [inserted “when” for grammatical integrity—insertion denoted by brackets]

In turn, radical democrats may refuse his reduction of politics to sovereignty, but if we then identify the properly political as nonsovereign action, as nonrule or (fugitive) refusal to be governed, we remain captive to this demonic picture of power and its idealized other. By affirming only the “power to” of solidarity and action in concert, we risk disavowing power “over,” as participation in rule, as explicit rule-making, and as “ruling out” antidemocratic interests and practices. Do we imagine that generativity thrives only by refusing rule, and not also through forms of structure and even imposition, as parents and teachers know? As Prospero, a personification of both sovereignty and theory, finally acknowledged Caliban as the “dark thing” he must “own as mine,” the trope of fugitivity entails a disavowed remainder, the problem of power and rule, which needs to be acknowledged. For freedom requires not only flight from rule, but flight into it, as a problem that no one can escape, but that a democratic politics explicitly acknowledges and undertakes to rework by participatory practices of contest.40

Using Moten’s own idiom, I would ask: “What if” we do not dichotomize the informal assembly and praxis of fugitive sociality, and politics-as-rule predicated on exclusion and regulation of difference? “What if” a democratic theory must blur the social and political but also acknowledge inescapable, fraught, yet potentially fruitful tensions—between tacit grammar and explicit acts of translation, between informal form and organized forms of power, between fugitive aliveness as resistance to rule, and organizing democratic power to make claims on how the world is ruled? “What if” we refuse (not reverse) the abstract polarity between subjection to sovereign rule as such, or statelessness as refusal to be governed as such, and “come down to earth” as Marx put it? We then find politicality not in rule or nonrule, as such, but in the judgments and actions by which subalterns address who makes decisions (and how) about which practices, values, and inequalities are being ruled out, or which encouraged, in the communities they are building by socio-poetic insurgency? In difficult historical contexts they rework and mediate tacit grammars, customary practices, and explicit forms of organized power as they reconstitute democratic forms of rule-making.41

These what-ifs suggest a conversation between Moten and Sheldon Wolin. The parallels are striking. Wolin depicts a “system” so “immovable and interconnected as to be unreformable as a totality”; he calls “pessimism” a “reasoned insight” and “suppressed revolutionary impulse”; and he endorses a “rejectionism” whereby citizens “withdraw and direct their energies and civic commitment to finding new life forms.” Moreover, “instead of imitating most political theories,” which adopt “the state as the primary structure, and adapt the activity of citizens” to it, Wolin refuses “the state paradigm” and the “liberal-legal corruption of the citizen.” He affirms how “common life resides in cooperation and reciprocity that human beings develop to survive, meet their needs, and explore their capacities and the remarkable world into which they have been cast.” He thus rejects Arendt’s splitting of political and social, and her valorization of the “who,” and in Moten’s terms he instead values how “entanglement and virtuosity” are negotiated in the “common life” of the ordinary. Both theorists thus defend “preservation” of customary ways of “taking care of beings and things,” as Wolin says, against neoliberal correction, progressive promises of incorporation, and radical romances of emancipation.42

Moten’s two antagonisms—between the few who run things and things that run, and between informal form and formalization—echo Wolin’s critique of bureaucracy, of “institutionalized systems of power,” and of “constitutional democracy”; and Moten’s refusals resonate with Wolin’s late claim that democracy names not a form of government but “fugitive” moments of insurgency. And though Wolin seems to mean “fugitive” only in its temporal sense of transient or fleeting, he also depicts democracy as interdicted by idioms of governance, contained by constitutions and organized power, and pathologized by norms stipulating the legal and proper. Like blackness— though Wolin never makes this association—his democracy is (called) criminal, transgressive, and chaotic; it is feared, hunted, and enclosed, though also “wanted,” desired, and used for legitimation. Both theorists embrace such epithets while showing how insurgency bespeaks “jurisgenerative” energies, engendered by commonality and memory, that precede and surround formal (state-centric) politics. Their fugitive protagonists—an undercommons or popular insurgency—claim a spatial and symbolic distance from a deranged modern regime, and in Wolin’s words “replace the old citizenship” by “a fuller and wider notion of being, whose politicalness will be expressed not in one or two activities—voting or protesting—but in many.” Of course, this very “politicalness” is one mark of deep differences.43

Though Wolin’s awareness of racial inequality appears in repeated associations of democratic moments and social movements with black insurgency, he does not grasp how “commonality” names not (only) a resource against enclosure but the historical production of whiteness and settler colonialism. He laments the gap between formal citizenship and genuine participation, which effectively disempowers legally enfranchised citizens, but never construes citizenship as a racial status, “standing” as white, constituted by a racial state of exception. His hard-pressed “citizens” draw on tacit (local, rooted) customs, but he does not credit how their “commonality” reproduces popular power by racial terror. Moten thus brings to this idiom of commonality and democracy, as to Arendt’s “common sense” and “world,” a justified presumption that such predicates of the political mean antiblackness. But acknowledging this truth is also the premise of thinking abolition and radical democracy together.44

For if Wolin’s commonality risks racial innocence, his idea of the political remains essential because it highlights the foreclosures in Moten’s sociality. First, Wolin depicts both tacit commonality and explicit insurgency as contingent and, in that sense, as political. Whereas Moten depicts sociality underwritten by ontology, and reproduced as antiblackness generates “common habitation and flight,” Wolin sees every (under)common undone by political economy and individualism, not only by incorporation into formal politics. Whereas Moten imagines the “absolute sufficiency” of sociality informally reproduced, Wolin argues that commonality itself is (re)generated and remade only by practices that, though “emerging out of” sociality, politicize—acknowledge, (re)articulate, or (re)organize—tacit customs and vernacular memories. Tacit commonality is at once discovered, remade and regenerated only [when] people make explicit claims in “public declarations,” or visibly exercise “collective power” to “promote or protect the well-being” of a “collectivity,” including an undercommon.45

Second, Wolin also links and distinguishes sociality and politicality by depicting the experience and practice of sharing and exercising power. For Wolin, local or customary “institutions and practices are sustained” only by our “capacity to share in power, to cooperate in it.” “Power to,” generated and shared by the ongoing practices of assembly and cooperation that Moten calls planning, is thus the basis of all other goods. But, as “distilled” from the “relations and circles we move within”—call this Moten’s sociality—this power, at once “symbolic, material, and psychological,” “enables political beings to act together.” As the political dimension of sociality, “power” can be extracted by states or undermined by individualism, and thus alienated, a loss that devitalizes the solidarity—and thereby the generative capacity—of sociality. The recurring “loss of the political,” as capacities to articulate the tacit and organize power, reveals the nature of the political as a distinctive “mode of experience,” for “we are always losing it and having to recover it.” But “renewal” is always possible, partly “as human beings rediscover the common being of human beings,” partly by “creating new patterns of commonality” across differences, and partly by (re)making “modes of action” by which to “concert their powers.” Though grounded in sociality, Wolin’s political thus opens an interval between the tacit and the explicit, in which experience is metabolized and (re)articulated. In this interval people question the organization of power and rules of justice, and they answer as they “reinvent forms and practices” that express “a democratic conception of collective life.”46

For Moten, of course, “democratic” and collective” signal the alienated rule that abstracts from lived sociality to “designate” a political to represent us, whereas black fugitives refuse to be governed or represented by others but also to translate themselves into legible political terms. In contrast, Wolin offers a potentially fruitful, not only correctional or appropriative—we might say agonistic—relation between the tacit and the explicit. In fact, practices of “fugitive democracy” recurrently emerge in and from black sociality, as the practices of Black Lives Matter activism most recently demonstrate. For sure, practices of concealment and evasion, which defend black fugitivity from surveillance, regulatory correction, and violence, and practices of public action that engage whites and the state, are contradictory in crucial ways, as Juliet Hooker has argued. But as Rom Coles and Lia Haro argue, frontline communities on the underground railroad also engaged repeatedly in “flagrantly public” action in concert, both in literal self-defense of black autonomy in its fugitive illegality, and to contest the rule(s) of police, the law, and the state; as recent protests suggest, they viewed formal political institutions both as “integral to white supremacy so far,” but also “as potential instruments toward emancipatory ends.”47

If Hooker sees temporal shifts between moments of “black fugitivity” and moments of “fugitive democracy” in the thought and practice of Frederick Douglass, Coles/Haro depict an ongoing “oscillation” between inward-facing and outward-turning practices. Likewise, Neil Roberts defends grand marronage for seeking a “sustainable rather than fleeting form of flight” by forging autonomous spaces, and yet, because “freedom in our world lies not in permanent evasion of Leviathan” but in “taming” it, he proposes an idea of “sociogenic marronage” to reconstruct “an order in need of systemic repair.” Not coincidentally, Wolin’s fugitive democracy, though “rejectionist” and antistatist in its major chords, includes a social democratic minor key, which notes the limits of localism and the necessity of seeking and using state power to address structural inequality and collective fate.48

Complex and generative tensions are lost, then, as Moten recovers the freedom schools organized by Fannie Lou Hamer but not her organizing for the right to vote, to exercise popular sovereignty locally, especially around police and schools, but also to create a “Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” that entered national politics. Hamer (like the Black Panthers and Black Lives Matter) models how black radicalism has lived in an interval between the tacit grammar and ongoing “planning” of black fugitivity—as loopholes of retreat practiced and concealed in plain sight—and flagrant publicity as fugitive democracy. Whereas for Moten, the historical failure or defeat of outward-facing public action proves the futility of fugitive democracy, I would ask: “what if” we follow his own fugitive view that any being or act is both incomplete and excessive, to infer that specific historical experiments are not definitive failures, but unfinished in meaning, examples we could retrieve and refashion now? If keeping open such possibility risks cruel optimism, foreclosing it reifies the impasse he generatively transvalues in so many other ways.

# 2NC

## K---Nonviolence

#### We also have an external impact---it condemns millions in the crossfire. That risks millions of lives and materially harms marginalized people most.

**Martin 11**, (Professor of Social Sciences, University of Wollongong, and MacLeod - Solidarity activist, civil resistance educator and doctoral candidate at the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Queensland, The legal strategy for West Papua: Will it fly? What might help it to?, sydney.edu.au/arts/peace\_conflict/docs/working\_papers/WPP%203.pdf)

With equal odds of success, nonviolent struggle to end the Indonesian military occupation of West Papua is **definitely more desirable** than armed struggle: it causes **less loss of life**, allows for **greater participation** of ordinary people, and **lays the basis for a free** and **open society** after independence. The evidence on the results of mixing armed and nonviolent struggle, on the other hand, indicates that using a mixed defence strategy **lessens the likelihood** that the movement will achieve their goals. 13

#### Tuck and Yang agrees---unsettlement is only valuable insofar as it results in a return of the land

Tuck and Yang, ’12 Eve Tuck, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities, a William T Grant Scholar, and was a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow, and K. Wayne Yang, Ph.D. in Social and Cultural Studies from the University of California Berkeley, 2012, “Decolonization is not a metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, <https://www.latrobe.edu.au/staff-profiles/data/docs/fjcollins.pdf>, EO

Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”

#### 1---It’ll empower white reactionaries who coopt and undermine any revolution

Culp & Bond-Graham 14 (Visiting Assistant Professor of Rhetoric Studies at Whitman College; a sociologist and investigative journalist, ANDREW CULP and DARWIN BOND-GRAHAM, Left Gun Nuts, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/29/left-gun-nuts/)

The more radical variant of this argument is that “the people” need guns to wage an eventual revolution and liberate themselves from the shackles of the state and corporate America. Gun control need not dampen the spirit of those still hoping for a revolution, even if such a revolution is highly unlikely to happen in our lifetimes. What stands in the way of such leftist dreams are the vast majority of current gun owners. Over-represented among current gun owners are white reactionary men, the types who regularly expresses their desire to shoot on sight the “Muslim socialist” president of the United States, and who “muster” along the U.S.-Mexico boarder with their weaponry to defend the nation against “alien” immigrants. As it stands, toxic gun culture would coopt any new American revolution with a lethal cocktail of supercharged masculinity, racism, and provincialism fantasized about in post-apocalyptic scenes. If the United States ever comes to another civil war, the first thing to die under a barrage of lead will be our hope for a more just and democratic society; guns would empower warlords with petty political agendas, not egalitarian-minded freedom fighters. The most likely cultural shift away from reactionary gun ownership will not happen in cooperation with the Right and their politics, but against it. Gun control is the best place to start. Disarming the Right will do more to advance goals toward a revolutionary democratic transformation of America than trying to beat the Right-wingers (and the U.S. government!) in an arms race. Of course Left insurrectionists who advocate the right to bear arms are more focused on the U.S. Government as the singular impediment to their variant of utopia. This dream is sadly a classic example of radical posturing done in the name of some distant hypothetical moment, and it ignores the actual harm that guns cause each and every day. In the real world, guns kill upwards of 30,000 Americans every year, virtually all of these deaths serving absolutely no political purpose in the fight for a more democratic society. Most of these deaths are just tragic accidents or suicides, many of which would not end in death if guns were not in the mix. Left fantasies about armed struggle are the same half-baked ideas as those held by the secessionist Right. What varies for Leftists is the template of decolonial struggles; yet a leftist revolution in the United States would not kick out a small minority of foreign occupiers, as happened in India and Vietnam, but would be a fight amongst settler colonialists for political authoristy. This is why the worn “Zapatistas defense” touted by the radical left is a bad analogy for the United States context – the Zapatistas started a peasant rebellion that kicked outsiders off their landbase, a task for which wooden cutouts of guns turned out to be more effective than the real thing.

#### 2---It’ll re-create oppressive dynamics – empirics proves armed revolution ties new rulers to the security apparatus – encourages repressive crackdowns

**Spenser 95**, (Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social, Review: The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico, www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=187)

\*Paradox of Revolution\* is thought-provoking and delivers what it promises. The title of the book refers to the historical experience of popular mobilization and socioeconomic transformation which "most commonly eventuate in a new form of authoritarian rule." (P. 1) In all of the known cases of revolutionary change, the elites that seized the state's power expanded and centralized it. In Mexico, following a successful consolidation of a governing coalition in which peasants and workers played a central part, the revolutionary elite **relegated them to a subordinate position**. But having reviewed at great detail the Mexican case, and brought to bear the cases of **Russia**, **China**, **Cuba**, **Vietnam** and **Nicaragua** among others, is the authoritarian outcome of revolutions such a paradox as Middlebrook sustains? Have not we seen **time and time again** a **dissonance between** the **concept and reality**? Hence, does not reality force us to reexamine our concept, in which case the **authoritarian rule** resulting from revolutions may not be such a paradox after all?

## Adv---Case

#### It will be overpowered and backfire, intensifying racial violence

Luke 2015 (TW[University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg], 10/29/15, “On Insurrectionality: Theses on Contemporary Revolts and Resilience”, Globalizations, Volume 12, 2015 - Issue 6, Taylor and Francis, accessed 9/19/16) JA

With the militarization of municipal, regional and national police forces in the USA and other OECD countries (one here can think about the overly aggressive display of military-grade weaponry in response at Ferguson, Missouri or Keene, New Hampshire to civil rights protest or student mayhem that was not wholly unlike that of Egyptian military and police forces in Tahrir Square), new global trends of social control and organization, rooted in resilient styles of governance, are gelling in the turbulence of insurrectionality. Add to these rapid response forces, the securitized surveillance system of closed-circuit television, cybertracking, biometric scanning, and addressable individual tracking devices; and, the withering away of many other streams of popular ideological resistance as corrective feedback loops, the powers that be, have been, and will be seem, if they are truly sophisticated, to be adding insurrection to their risk society calculi. Indeed, these new integers for innovation justify building and enforcing a potent mix of resilience tactics, which are tested as ideology and practice for continued elite empowerment. Rising up in the streets against authority in the fury of intense insurrection is acceptable, but standing up slowly to truly assume power has become much less likely. Still, the collapse of economic growth, the decay of middle and working class job opportunities, civic infrastructure decay, loss of public goods, and degradation of private markets are all generating and maintaining a high level of insurrectional energy (Luke, 2012 Luke, T. W. (2012). “Informatic spatiality, electronic agency, cybernetic structure and the new people power: Occupy movements at play in network systems,” Fast Capitalism, 9(1). Retrieved from www.fastcapitalism.com. ). Now the elite discourses embedded in the reproduction of existing power structures knowingly accedes to insurrection, and even can concede conceptually, its justifiable bases, which endorses its existence as ‘insurrectionable development'. Instead of a ‘clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996 Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of order. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. ), these arrangements for a resilient adaptation to recurrent anarchy are the nuts and bolts needed for ‘governing the present' (Miller & Rose, 2008 Miller, P. & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the present: Administering economic, social and personal life. Cambridge: Polity. ). Governance games on this scale harness legitimate corrective impulses from the outsiders, underclasses, and superfluous populace to make improvements in some state and non-state services, which usually enhance systemic resilience, regime stability, and the sustainability of ruling alliance/elite/bloc/class power (Guattari & Negri, 2010 Guattari, F. & Negri, A. (2010). New lines of alliance, new spaces of liberty. Brooklyn, NY: Automedia. ). Are insurrections—both peaceful and violent instances of direct action—crucial opportunities for policy innovations? They seem to appear as fluid zones of indeterminate determination where layers of opposition and acceptance arguably are ‘at once economic, political, and cultural—and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the forms of life … creating new public spaces and new forms of community' (Hardt & Negri, 2000 Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. , p. 56). Likewise, do insurrections reconfigure ‘the organization of the social worker and immaterial labor' in which ‘bodies are on the front lines of this battle, bodies that consolidate in an irreversible way the results of past struggles and incorporate a power that has been gained ontologically' (Hardt & Negri, 2000 Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. , p. 410) stand ready to OWS, but are they also truly unable to ever manage Wall Street? Along these lines, insurrection becomes yet one more reflexive dimension of modernity's disciplinary modulations of individual and collective human life. State authority rationally maps, and then manages the degrees of freedom allowed in the life of its subjects or citizens through the dispositifs at work in many embedded institutions woven into the territorial fabric of states. The command and control containments of these degrees of unruly freedom, which are clearly allowed to human life by state power, unevenly meld sovereignty, territoriality, and population as new resistant-and-resilient coproductions of governmentality (Foucault, 1978 Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality, volume I: An introduction. New York, NY: Random House. ). Hence, resilience-ready rulers often use popular direct action effectively to ensnare the population in ‘apparatuses of security', like those created by various police forces, homeland security units, public health measures, etc., in a manner such that these events also address ‘health, education and social welfare systems and the mechanisms of the management of the national economy' (Dean, 1999 Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. , p. 20). In turn, can these governmentalizations of insurrectionable developments settle into ‘the juridical and administrative apparatuses of the state in all of the ways that optimize the health, welfare and life of populations' as biopolitical formations (Dean, 1999 Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. , p. 20)? Quite clearly, this complex style of resilient response must be studied, since the emergent regimentations of governance practices have ‘a technical or technological dimension' with new adaptive strategies that display ‘characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range of effects' (Dean, 1999 Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: Sage. , p. 21). Seeing insurrectionality as a tactical move for the defense of fluid, global and unstable public order follows from Foucault's vision of the apparatuses of government. The problematization of insurrectionable developments as constructive moments of collective purpose seconds his sense of the world today, namely,  … not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1997 Foucault, M. (1997). The essential works, 1954–1984, vol. 1 ethics, subjectivity and truth (Paul Rabinow, Ed.). New York, NY: The New Press. , p. 256) The division of social forces into ‘insurrectionists' that are continuously tracked by ‘anti-insurrectionist' security assessment experts, working as ‘threat assessment teams' to assay ‘teeming assessable threats' confirms this consciousness of everything merely being dangerous, and thereby producing a fluid new social order out of constant flexible imperatives that assure all they will have ‘something to do'. Strangely, ‘endangerment' becomes a new operational baseline assumption for making the advances of ‘development'. Are these strategies leading to more secure order, or only securitizing everyday life to accustom citizens to living on the minimal basis they appear to accept? They are unruly wards protected by quasi-police state power, who permit the public to protest the conditions of their confinement in advocacy networks within and across borders, but always remain at the mercy of the same resilient power practitioners (Keck & Sikkink, 1998 Keck, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ). Ironically, insurrectionality serves multiple purposes; but, most importantly, its practices sustain resilient state networks for ruling elites, and this link cultivates the expected outcomes—a barely passable life for the masses trapped in shells of passivity, dependency, and inaction that remarkably are regarded by far too many citizens, clients or consumers as the freedoms of insurrectional agency.

#### It doesn’t matter how much stuff is smashed unless it can actually reduce the violence imposed by systems of oppression

Day 9 (Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project, ttp://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical\_failure\_of\_aanarchism\_chris\_day\_kasama.pdf)

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn’t do the victims of capitalism any good if you don’t actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn’t do the victims of the state any good if you don’t actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the good. But it is worthless if we don’t develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally, revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously, there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don’t have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn’t have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldn’t be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain problems are persistent ones and that if we can’t say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future

#### Fugitivity fails to escape or mitigate violence---gets trapped in the university

Webb 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997). Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision. There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

#### Doubling forms the basis for the most excessive forms of violence

McLean 16 Aisha, Graduate Dissertation, University of Sheffield. “Power and Racialisation: Exploring the childhood and educational experiences of four mixed young people using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.” 2016.

Fanon: Psychoanalytic theories of Colonialism. Frantz Fanon was an anti-colonial thinker of the twentieth century, whose texts include ‘The Wretched of the Earth’ (Fanon, 2004) and ‘Black Skin, White Masks’ (Fanon, 1967). Fanon’s personal background as a Black man, and his professional background in psychoanalysis and phenomenology, led him to write about anti-colonialism from a psychological perspective. Fanon’s writing is particularly interested in the power of Whiteness, and the psychological systems which have developed as part of this process of maintenance, particularly within the Black psyche (Leonardo and Porter, 2010). The psychology of colonialism and Blackness are unpicked in direct relation to Whiteness. The inferiority that White structures of colonialism have created toward and within Blackness are embedded within Fanon’s work (Sardar, 2008). In Fanon’s work, colonialism is seen as an act of violence against Black people (Sardar, 2008). Leonardo and Porter (2010) argue for the relationship between colonialism and education as different sides of the same institutional structures, which continue to inflict acts of subjugation and violence against Black people. Modern education is thus seen as a means of maintaining White dominance and White ‘comfort’ (Leonardo and Porter, 2010), which keeps Whiteness ‘safe’ from difficult discussions about race and racism. Fanonian theory draws significantly on the theory of interpellation; embedded within issues of power and subjugation. Interpellation is discussed in the ‘definitions’ table in the introduction (pp. 1). In brief, interpellation refers to Althusser’s (1971) theory where individuals ‘recognise themselves as ‘hailed’ or placed in categories by ideology’ (Abdi, 2015 pp.60). In this instance, an interaction of dominance and subjugation is enacted through placing the interpellated into a category based on pre-set, racialised views of what the interpellated person ‘is’. Fanon (1967) also builds on ideas of ‘doubling’ or the ‘doubled self’ as introduced by DuBois (1994) in relation to interpellation. In doubling, individuals recognise themselves as positioned within a particular racialised category by others. The associated ‘ways of being’ within this racialised category are also recognised by the individual being positioned. In this dynamic, the individual who recognises themselves as perceived in such a way takes up the position, and behaves the way they feel the other expects them to (Fanon, 1967). This act of ‘doubling’ is seen by Fanon (1967, 1961) as an act of subjugation against the racialised group, both on an individual and on an ideological level. On an individual level, in recognising their positioning by others and responding to it as they expect the positioning to mean, the individual submits to a narrow view of themselves as defined only by their racialised categorisation (Fanon, 1967). This limits their view of themselves outside of this category, and disavows their identity on an individual level. On an ideological level, the individual submits to and recreates the ideological construction of their racialisation, thus maintaining the construction of their racialised self as a ‘truth’ of that racialised category (Fanon, 1967).

#### The 1ACs emphasis on disrupting whiteness creates investments in the perpetuation of racial violence.

Mbembe 15. Achille Mbembe, “Achille Mbembe on The State of South African Political Life,” Africa As A Country, September 19, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/

The old politics of waiting is therefore gradually replaced by a new politics of impatience and, if necessary, of disruption. Brashness, disruption and a new anti-decorum ethos are meant to bring down the pretence of normality and the logics of normalization in this most “abnormal” society.  Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon and a plethora of black feminist, queer, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race theorists are being reloaded in the service of a new form of militancy less accommodationist and more trenchant both in form and content.

The age of impatience is an age when a lot is said – all sorts of things we had hardly heard about during the last twenty years; some ugly, outrageous, toxic things, including calls for murder, atrocious things that speak to everything except to the project of freedom, in this age of fantasy and hysteria, when the gap between psychic realities and actual material realities has never been so wide, and the digital world only serves as an amplifier of every single moment, event and accident.

The age of urgency is also an age when new wounded bodies erupt and undertake to actually occupy spaces they used to simply haunt. They are now piling up, swearing and cursing, speaking with excrements, asking to be heard.

They speak in allegories and analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and spaces, at the risk of anachronism.

They are claiming all kinds of rights – the right to violence; the right to disrupt and jam that which is parading as normal; the right to insult, intimidate and bully those who do not agree with them; the right to be angry, enraged; the right to go to war in the hope of recovering what was lost through conquest; the right to hate, to wreak vengeance, to smash something, it doesn’t matter what, as long as it looks “white”.

All these new “rights” are supposed to achieve one thing we are told the 1994 “peaceful settlement” did not achieve – decolonization and retributive justice, the only way to restore a  modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today.

Demythologizing whiteness

And yet, some hard questions must be asked.

Why are we invested in turning whiteness, pain and suffering into such erotogenic objects?

Could it be that the concentration of our libido on whiteness, pain and suffering is after all typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this neoliberal age?

To frame the issues in these terms does not mean embracing a position of moral relativism. How could it be? After all, in relation to our history, too many lives were destroyed in the name of whiteness. Furthermore, the structural repetition of past sufferings in the present is beyond any reasonable doubt.  Whiteness as a necrophiliac power structure and a primary shaper of a global system of unequal redistribution of life chances will not die a natural death.

But to properly engineer its death – and thus the end of the nightmare it has been for a large portion of the humanity – we urgently need to demythologize it.

If we fail to properly demythologize whiteness, whiteness – as the machine in which a huge portion of the humanity has become entangled in spite of itself – will end up claiming us.

As a result of whiteness having claimed us; as a result of having let ourselves be possessed by it in the manner of an evil spirit, we will inflict upon ourselves injuries of which whiteness, at its most ferocious, would scarcely have been capable.

Indeed for whiteness to properly operate as the destructive force it is in the material sphere, it needs to capture its victim’s imagination and turn it into a poison well of hatred.

For victims of white racism to hold on to the things that truly matter, they must incessantly fight against the kind of hatred which never fails to destroy, in the first instance, the man or woman who hates while leaving the structure of whiteness itself intact.

As a poisonous fiction that passes for a fact, whiteness seeks to institutionalize itself as an event by any means necessary. This it does by colonizing the entire realms of desire and of the imagination.

To demythologize whiteness, it will not be enough to force “bad whites” into silence or into confessing guilt and/or complicity. This is too cheap.

To puncture and deflate the fictions of whiteness will require an entirely different regime of desire, new approaches in the constitution of material, aesthetic and symbolic capital, another discourse on value, on what matters and why.

# 1NR

## k - economization

### 2NC---OV

#### Naturalizing neoliberal social relations has tangible impacts on debaters

Monbiot 16 [George Monbiot is the author of the bestselling books The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order and Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain, as well as the investigative travel books Poisoned Arrows, Amazon Watershed and No Man's Land. His latest book is Feral: Searching for Enchantment on the ­Frontiers of Rewilding (being published in paperback as Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea and Human Life), Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems, Guardian, 4-1-2016, Accessible Online at https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot] 7-13-2016

Imagine if the people of the Soviet Union had never heard of communism. The ideology that dominates our lives has, for most of us, no name. Mention it in conversation and you’ll be rewarded with a shrug. Even if your listeners have heard the term before, they will struggle to define it. Neoliberalism: do you know what it is? Its anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its power. It has played a major role in a remarkable variety of crises: the financial meltdown of 2007‑8, the offshoring of wealth and power, of which the Panama Papers offer us merely a glimpse, the slow collapse of public health and education, resurgent child poverty, the epidemic of loneliness, the collapse of ecosystems, the rise of Donald Trump. But we respond to these crises as if they emerge in isolation, apparently unaware that they have all been either catalysed or exacerbated by the same coherent philosophy; a philosophy that has – or had – a name. What greater power can there be than to operate namelessly? Inequality is recast as virtuous. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. So pervasive has neoliberalism become that we seldom even recognise it as an ideology. We appear to accept the proposition that this utopian, millenarian faith describes a neutral force; a kind of biological law, like Darwin’s theory of evolution. But the philosophy arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power. Neoliberalism sees competition as the defining characteristic of human relations. It redefines citizens as consumers, whose democratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency. It maintains that “the market” delivers benefits that could never be achieved by planning. Attempts to limit competition are treated as inimical to liberty. Tax and regulation should be minimised, public services should be privatised. The organisation of labour and collective bargaining by trade unions are portrayed as market distortions that impede the formation of a natural hierarchy of winners and losers. Inequality is recast as virtuous: a reward for utility and a generator of wealth, which trickles down to enrich everyone. Efforts to create a more equal society are both counterproductive and morally corrosive. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. We internalise and reproduce its creeds. The rich persuade themselves that they acquired their wealth through merit, ignoring the advantages – such as education, inheritance and class – that may have helped to secure it. The poor begin to blame themselves for their failures, even when they can do little to change their circumstances. Never mind structural unemployment: if you don’t have a job it’s because you are unenterprising. Never mind the impossible costs of housing: if your credit card is maxed out, you’re feckless and improvident. Never mind that your children no longer have a school playing field: if they get fat, it’s your fault. In a world governed by competition, those who fall behind become defined and self-defined as losers. Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us Among the results, as Paul Verhaeghe documents in his book What About Me? are epidemics of self-harm, eating disorders, depression, loneliness, performance anxiety and social phobia. Perhaps it’s unsurprising that Britain, in which neoliberal ideology has been most rigorously applied, is the loneliness capital of Europe. We are all neoliberals now.

#### 2---It drives capitalist infiltration and splinters the affs politics of decolonization into individualistic disruption that ultimately empower global capital

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 5-6)

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

### 2NC---Perm

#### It’s not just the word “anti-competitive”, the way it was used promoted market logic---they pre-empted framework’s attempt to “determine what types of knowledge are valuable in this space and not”---that reflects the neoliberal desire a deregulated free marketplace of ideas

Thomas W. Joo 14, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law, “The Worst Test of Truth: The "Marketplace of Ideas" as Faulty Metaphor,” Tulane Law Review, 89, 383, December 2014, lexis.

III. Critique of the Metaphor

A. Market Competition as the "Best Test of Truth"

1. Normative "Truth"

The marketplace metaphor is most often invoked to support the notion that competitive discourse identifies normative "truth." But that view, no less than the Alvarez view, is unsupported by market theory. A market is a mechanism that reflects, in terms of prices, aggregated individual preferences. 172Link to the text of the note Success in the market means commanding favorable prices by satisfying the preferences of market participants. 173Link to the text of the note Markets are said "to deliver the best goods most efficiently [but] "best' is here defined solely ex post facto as that product which does so triumph or prevail in the marketplace." 174Link to the text of the note That is, product markets supply the kinds of items consumers prefer, at the prices consumers prefer to pay. These products may or may not be normatively good, as the popularity of tobacco, unhealthy foods, and polluting technologies attest. Similarly, capital markets provide the kinds of investments that investors prefer. The normative value of such investments does not necessarily follow: they may cater to irrational investor preferences, support socially undesirable enterprises, or contribute to systemic financial volatility (as the subprime mortgage debacle demonstrated).

Indeed, orthodox market theory is entirely agnostic with respect to normative "truth." It makes no claims about whether preferences are good in any objective sense. As one critique of the marketplace metaphor put it, "If consumers do not value truth very much (relatively speaking), perfect competition will efficiently ensure that they don't get very much truth as compared with other goods [such as entertainment, for example]." 175Link to the text of the note Free market theory may assume that it is good for people to formulate and act on their own preferences, but that is not the same as maintaining that those preferences are good ones; indeed, it is based on a refusal to judge individual preferences.

[\*409] The association of competitive success with normative superiority does not follow from the economic theory of markets. It is, however, consistent with noxious social notions, such as eugenics, that were popular around the time of Abrams. 176Link to the text of the note As noted above, Justice Holmes himself infamously advocated eugenics in his opinion for the Court in Buck v. Bell, upholding a law authorizing the forced sterilization of "mental defectives." 177Link to the text of the note Justice Holmes believed that the offspring of such "defectives" would be inferior members of society, and thus did not deserve to be born. "It is better for all the world," he wrote, "if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." 178Link to the text of the note Similarly, the evolutionary concept of "survival of the fittest" is often misinterpreted as a value judgment. 179Link to the text of the note But Charles Darwin himself drew a distinction between the competitively advantageous and the normatively good. 180Link to the text of the note Unlike Justice Holmes in Buck, Darwin insisted that the impulse to protect the weak is "the noblest part of our nature" and its moral value outweighs any "bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind." 181Link to the text of the note

2. Empirical Truth

As argued above, the Court's insistence in Alvarez that markets identify empirical truth is a misreading of prior "marketplace of ideas" jurisprudence, which deals with normative choices, not empirical facts. It is also inconsistent with the way markets behave in both theory and practice. Economic markets do not operate to identify empirical truth any more than they identify normative "truth." Markets involve the buying and selling of products, services, securities, and the like. Such things (with few exceptions, such as nonfiction books) are neither true [\*410] nor false in the empirical sense. Rather, as noted above, they are merely preferred or not preferred.

Nor do markets reliably screen out false information about the products in the market. Such a belief depends on the dubious assumption that individuals are wise and rational enough to tell the difference between accurate and inaccurate information. 182Link to the text of the note Cognitive psychology research has demonstrated our inability to distinguish empirical truth from fiction. 183Link to the text of the note Markets have created countless asset bubbles based on misperceptions, from the South Sea bubble to tulip mania to the more recent dot-com and subprime bubbles. 184Link to the text of the note

#### It’s a value-laden statement disguised as an analogy that cloaks the spread of neoliberal ideology

Thomas W. Joo 14, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law, “The Worst Test of Truth: The "Marketplace of Ideas" as Faulty Metaphor,” Tulane Law Review, 89, 383, December 2014, lexis.

IV. Conclusion

As every grade-school English student learns, a metaphor is a figure of speech stating that one thing "is" another. Metaphors can work considerable mischief when that equation is taken literally. First Amendment jurisprudence takes literally the metaphorical statement that speech "is" a market. That is, rather than merely drawing figurative parallels between public discourse and economic markets, it collapses them into a single concept called "markets." 319Link to the text of the note This literalization of the legal metaphor has been helped along by economic analyses of law and policy, which have insisted that nearly all forms of social activity are literally economic markets. 320Link to the text of the note

At the same time that the scope of "market" has been expanding, the scope of "speech" protected under the First Amendment has been expanding as well. Justice Holmes and Justice Brennan cleverly deployed market rhetoric when it fit the zeitgeist of the Lochner and Cold War eras. More recently, it has been argued, corporations and business interests have turned the tables and displayed similar rhetorical "opportunism" by reframing their economic rights arguments in the more appealing language of the First Amendment. 321Link to the text of the note A long line of campaign finance cases, culminating most recently in Citizens United, has treated spending in support of candidates as speech, regardless of the identity of the spender. Commercial speech, once considered outside the First Amendment, enjoys considerable [\*432] constitutional protection. The First Amendment also protects nonverbal conduct; it "does not end at the spoken or written word." 322Link to the text of the note

If everything is a market, and everything is speech, then everything is both market and speech, and the two categories are literally coterminous - but so broad as to be meaningless. If everything is a market, and markets should not be regulated, then nothing - neither speech nor anything else - should be regulated. As markets and speech (and everything else) collapse into a single notion, the "marketplace of ideas" rhetoric is no longer specifically about any of the values involved in free speech theory, such as expressive rights, listeners' interests, preventing government suppression of dissent, or the search for "truth" (whether normative or empirical). Nor is it about any of the important functions of markets, such as efficient allocation of resources or setting prices to reflect demand. It is simply antiregulatory. Skepticism of government is of course consistent with a long and fundamental libertarian tradition in Anglo-American thought. But the metaphor is more than skeptical. Because it lacks insights into how to limit regulation, it reduces to free-market and free-speech absolutism.

Furthermore, the marketplace of ideas metaphor advances an argument that fails on its own terms. It purports to be an instrumental theory based on the observed characteristics of markets - that is, it argues that speech deregulation will produce a good (i.e., "truth") in the way that unregulated markets allegedly do. But market processes do not produce truth, and the law polices markets vigorously for this very reason. There are of course many reasons to be skeptical of government regulation of both speech and of markets, but those reasons are specific to the distinct institutions of speech and those of economic markets. By claiming to identify "truth" as a shared reason for deregulating speech and markets, the marketplace metaphor ignores the actual, valuable functions of both speech and markets.

The marketplace rhetoric also illuminates the use of metaphor in legal argument and elsewhere. As this Article has argued, metaphors are often normative assertions disguised as reasoned analogical arguments. While a metaphor purports to use our knowledge about one phenomenon (such as "markets") to provide insights into a second phenomenon (such as "speech"), it is actually making arguments about [\*433] both the first and second phenomena. 323Link to the text of the note That is, the marketplace metaphor not only advances the assertion that speech should be unregulated like markets, but also tacitly advances the unexamined assertion that markets themselves should be unregulated.

#### Preemption is a political choice that is inseparable from a violent form of affective securitization that views the world as a target

**de Goede 14** [“Performing preemption,” Marieke de Goede, Stephanie Simon, Marijn Hoijtink, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, *Security Dialogue*, October 2014 vol. 45 no. 5 411-422]

Nearly 15 years after 9/11, the contributions to this special issue seek to grapple with how preemptive imperatives have made their way into routine security practice and bureaucratic operations. The special issue offers a range of in-depth empirical and conceptual studies across different practical domains in a European context – including health policy, civil security and local counter-terrorism – to interrogate how routinizing the imagination plays out across different domains. The issue shows how low-probability/high-impact threats – including, for example, pandemics, natural disasters and terrorist attacks – have been imagined and incorporated into everyday security practice. It analyses how data analytics, commercial practices and policing protocol embrace, contest and incorporate anticipatory, preemptive logics. With the notion of preemption, we refer to security practices that aim to act on threats that are unknown and recognized to be unknowable, yet deemed potentially catastrophic, requiring security intervention at the earliest possible stage (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007, 2011). Preemption is oriented toward the incertitude of the fundamentally unknown – not just because of missing data or incomplete calculations, but because there is a recognized lack of human knowledge and reliable parameters in a certain domain (Hildebrandt, 2010: 8, drawing on Stirling, 2003). The notion of radicalization, for example, is understood as such an unknown but potentially catastrophic and dispersed societal phenomenon. Despite the fact that the ‘process’ of radicalization is recognized to be non-linear and fundamentally unpredictable (Vermeulen and Bovenkerk, 2012), and despite a widely admitted lack of parameters to render it measurable, radicalization is now subject to EU-wide policy efforts that aim to achieve early, preemptive intervention (De Goede and Simon, 2012). As European Union (EU) Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malström (2014) put it in a recent speech, "We are currently facing a growing extremist threat which has mutated and evolved in the last few years, spreading across our continent. Terrorism is now being driven by a wide range of sources…. It is … time to focus Europe’s efforts on a truly preemptive response." There is no space here to engage the debate concerning the differences between precaution, preemption and preparedness (see e.g. Collier and Lakoff, 2008; De Goede and Randalls, 2009; Anderson, 2010). Our focus here is on the notion of preemption as an anticipatory security practice that anchors itself ‘unabashedly’ in uncertainty. For Massumi (2007: §13), this is not ‘due to a simple lack of knowledge … [but because] the nature of the threat cannot be specified…. [T]hreat has become proteiform and it tends to proliferate unpredictably’. Here, important parallels can be drawn with the notion of speculation. We regard preemption to be speculative, not because it is imaginative or unreal, but because it deploys notions of futurity that parallel the technologies of financial speculation. Like financial speculation, security preemption is not so much about predicting the future, but acts on multiple potential futures that are rendered actionable (or liquid) in the present (Cooper, 2010; De Goede, 2012; Amoore, 2013). Akin to speculation, the affective and anxious atmospheres of preemption (Simon, 2012) generate commercial and political investments in the face of a future that is recognized to be unknown. Speculative instruments like derivatives have been understood as turning the ‘contestability of fundamental value into a tradable commodity … [thus] provid[ing] a market benchmark for an unknowable value’ (Martin, 2013: 91, drawing on Bryan and Rafferty, 2006; emphasis in original). Following this logic, we may say that security preemption similarly turns the contestability of uncertain futures into commodities – in the form of action plans and government expenditure – while generating its own benchmarks of success. To return to the example of radicalization, a preemptive response here mobilizes local governments and civil society actors to intervene with ‘problem youth’; it seeks to broaden the space for law enforcement intervention; and it generates substantial expenditure toward knowledge networks (Malström, 2014). It fosters its own benchmarks for success: including measures of money spent and civil society cooperation enacted (but not necessarily evidence of radical paths rerouted or attacks prevented). Reading preemption in conjunction with speculation, then, generates attention to its productivity and commercial viability. This introduction draws on the notion of performativity in order to conceptualize preemption as a productive force. Performativity transcends the juxtaposition of the ‘ideal’ versus the ‘material’, instead arguing for the iterative constitution of objects and subjects through discursive practice (Butler, 1993; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). Put differently, performativity moves beyond a social constructivist agenda because it dispenses with ‘the separation … between the symbolic order and the particular situations within which that order is realised’ (Anderson and Harrison, 2010: 5). Not all of the articles in this special issue theorize their contribution through this lens. Still, we propose that this is a useful theoretical starting point because it draws attention to the fact that ‘preemption’ does not pre-exist its practice. Performativity highlights the situated materializations of preemption and underscores their processual entanglements with pre-existing security bureaucracies. Mik’s video installations are thought-provoking in this sense, because they invite the viewer to consider how the threshold between the surprising and the routine, the messy and the ordered, and the exceptional and the everyday are negotiated as events emerge and security is practiced in situ. Performativity is also a profoundly political lens: its focus on ‘recitation and repetition’ draws attention to the situated challenges, obstacles and stumbling blocks that shape preemption in practice (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 407). It recognizes that it is precisely through such situated iterations and negotiations that preemption takes shape.

### 2NC---AT: Conquergood

#### Conquergood explicitly advocates for adopting a critical approach to both text and performance

2AC Conquergood 2 (Dwight Conquergood “Performance Studies :Interventions and Radical Research” The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity. A number of performance studies-allied scholars create performances as a supplement to, not substitute for, their written research. These performance pieces stand alongside and in metonymic tension with pub- lished research. The creative works are developed for multiple professional rea- sons: they deepen experiential and participatory engagement with materials both for the researcher and her audience; they provide a dynamic and rhetorically compelling alternative to conference papers; they offer a more accessible and engaging format for sharing research and reaching communities outside academia; they are a strategy for staging interventions. To borrow Amanda Kemp's apt phrase, they use "performance both as a way of knowing and as a way of showing" (I998: I6). To add another layer to the enfolding convolutions of text and per- formance, several of these performance pieces have now been written up and published in scholarly journals and books (see Conquergood 1988; Becker, McCall, and Morris 1989; McCall and Becker I990; Paget I990; Pollock 1990; Jackson 1993, 1998; Allen and Garner 1995; Laughlin 1995; Wellin 1996; Jones 1997; Kemp I998). Performance studies is uniquely suited for the challenge of braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing. We can think through performance along three crisscrossing lines of activity and analysis. We can think of perfor- mance (I) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. Speaking from my home department at Northwestern, we often refer to the three a's of performance studies: artistry, analysis, activism. Or to change the alliteration, a commitment to the three c's of performance studies: creativity, critique, citizenship (civic strug- gles for social justice). We struggle to forge a unique and unifying mission around the triangulations of these three pivot points: I. Accomplishment-the making of art and remaking of culture; creativity; em- bodiment; artistic process and form; knowledge that comes from doing, par- ticipatory understanding, practical consciousness, performing as a way of knowing. 2. Analysis-the interpretation of art and culture; critical reflection; thinking about, through, and with performance; performance as a lens that illuminates the constructed creative, contingent, collaborative dimensions of human com- munication; knowledge that comes from contemplation and comparison; concentrated attention and contextualization as a way of knowing. 3. Articulation-activism, outreach, connection to community; applications and interventions; action research; projects that reach outside the academy and are rooted in an ethic of reciprocity and exchange; knowledge that is tested by practice within a community; social commitment, collaboration, and contri- bution/intervention as a way of knowing: praxis.

### 2NC---AT: Floating PIKs

#### Framing the K as ‘theft’ cedes to the capitalist assumption of private property, which is exploitative

Weisser 18 – Nathan Weisser, Public Relations and Graphics Designer at Works24, “The Circular Drain of Vagueness that is the Phrase, "Private Property is Theft"”, 3-30, <https://www.minds.com/blog/view/826516303619190784> [grammar edit in brackets]

A lot of people who follow the ideology of Marxism believe that the root of all evil can be boiled down [to] the exploitative nature of private property. Their idea has merit, because we face a problem on Earth: that there is a finite amount of resources, specifically land, and a potentially infinite amount of people to take up those resources. Therefore, by owning a stake in some of those finite resources, you are exercising exploitative practices over that infinite amount of people that need those resources and then must labor to get them from you.

So, a problem as been defined: finite resources, infinite populace.

The problem with Marxism, which I am using as a synonym for both Socialism and Communism, is that they try to solve this problem with bending the very fabric of nature around the fact that the problem exists, and seek to abolish the entire natural relationships of trade, voluntary labor, and currency to atone for the problem, instead of trying to solve the problem within the means of our reality.

Here's the memeable TL;DR of the point I'm trying to make:

"Private Property is Theft" is a paradox. The word "Theft", according to Marriam-Webster means, "the act of stealing; specifically : the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it". So, by merely using the word "theft" in your language, you have to cede to the reality that private (or personal) property is a fundamental right of the individual that is being stolen from.

I debate a lot on r/CapitalismVSocialism, (can't wait to not be on Reddit anymore) and you'll find that Marxists do take this belief to be the very center of their worldview. As a result of their entire worldview being boiled down to a paradox, they are forced into going into extreme vagueries every time they are confronted with an opposing view. It would be funny if it weren't so frustrating, because their vaguries are successful from time to time. Their step-by-step process to making progress goes like this:

1. Identify a problem inherit to reality

2. Staple that problem not on to reality itself, but on to people more successful than they

3. Get the whole world to recognize the problem

4. Say "it's this guy's fault", and watch the public feed.